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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERBERT BURTON and FLORENCE 
BURTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H. COOMBS, 
his wife, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR 
INN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, II, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 14254 
APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF.KIND OF CASE 
This is a Cross-Appeal by plaintiffs to require the 
defendants to perform a settlement offer made prior to and at 
the beginning of the trial court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, 
sitting without a jury, the Court found that the defendants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were not bound by the later acceptance of an offer of settle-
ment made at the beginning of the trial. Other issues were 
decided by the trial court which the defendant appealed to 
this court. However, those other appellate issues have been 
dismissed by stipulation of plaintiffs, Herbert and Florence 
Burton, and defendant, Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc. The only 
issue remaining to be heard by this court is the Cross-Appeal 
of respondents. Even though defendants are no longer appealing 
any issues, for the sake of clarity, they will still be referred 
to as the appellants. ^ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the determination of the lower 
court affirmed as to respondents1 Cross-Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DEFENDANTS MADE AN OFFER OF SETTLEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
TRIAL COURT. THE PLAINTIFFS REJECTED DEFENDANTS' OFFER AND 
THEN LATER TENDERED ACCEPTANCE. THE COURT PROPERLY RULED 
THAT PLAINTIFFS1 ACCEPTANCE WAS NOT BINDING UPON DEFENDANTS. 
In an effort to preclude the necessity of a trial, 
as well as to avoid the claim for anticipatory breach, defendants 
filed with the court, about a week before trial, a pleading which 
was entitled "Reaffirmation of Tender of Performance." (T-13) 
By this pleading, the defendants not only reiterated their tender 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to allow the plaintiffs to resume their management of the first 
motel under the terms of the written Management Agreement, but 
they, in addition, offered to change the name of the second 
motel, an act not even required by the terms of the Management 
Agreement. Such a tender by the defendants was obviously made 
in an attempt to induce plaintiffs to forego their right of 
action for anticipatory breach. However, plaintiffs1 counsel, 
in his opening statement at the commencement of trial, rejected 
the defendantsf pleaded tender. (T-3) Even when defendants1 
counsel, in his opening statement, reasserted a tender of per-
formance in an effort to settle the anticipatory breach claim, 
the plaintiffs refused to accept it and instead proceeded with 
the litigation on the issue of anticipatory breach as well as 
other issues. (Respondents1 Brief, page 19). 
The effect of plaintiffs1 failure to accept the 
tender of performance at the commencement of the trial was to 
then require the defendants to continue to assert and prosecute 
their counterclaim based upon the plaintiffs1 breach of the 
Management Agreement. This included the claim that the plain-
tiffs had breached the contract by both non-performance and by 
repudiation. Obviously, the position which the defendants were 
then forced to assert became totally inconsistent with any con-
tinuing tender of performance since their counterclaim asserted 
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that the breach by the plaintiffs had the effect of rescinding 
the contract so as to relieve the defendants of any performance 
thereunder. Thus, after the taking of testimony at trial com-
menced, the parties were pursuing the litigation of their 
claim. The defendants were contending that the plaintiffs had 
breached the contract and had thereby brought it to an end and 
the plaintiffs were asserting the same against the defendants. 
As a part of their testimony during the first day of 
trial, each of the plaintiffs in turn testified under oath that 
they could not perform the Management Agreement. (T-74-78). 
Two concise rejections are: 
11Q In light of what has happened over the past year 
and a half do you think you could go back and work 
with Mr. Coombs in an employee-employer relationship? 
A I couldn't." (T-74). . 
" . . . All of these things go to show that Mr. Burton 
feels that he could not, could not continue to work 
under that arrangement, would not want to." (T-78). 
Such was an additional clear repudiation of the contract and 
a clear, express rejection of the defendants' previously-offered 
tender of performance. 
After the plaintiffs had fully presented their evi-
dence, defendants made a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
claim for anticipatory breach and presented arguments in 
support of said motion, noting reasons why the plaintiffs 
-4-
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had failed to prove the claim. Other motions and arguments 
were also made by the defendants at that time. The court then 
recessed the proceedings to consider the various motions/ and 
after having done so, the court called all counsel into cham-
bers and outlined his views on the merits of the motions, 
indicating, among other things, that the court's impression 
was that the plaintiffs' evidence on anticipatory breach was 
insufficient. Thus, at that time, the plaintiffs were informed 
that they had, in effect, failed to prove their claim on the 
issue of anticipatory breach. 
The stated purpose of the court for informing the 
parties concerning its impressions after the defendants' motions 
had been made was to induce further good faith settlement nego-
tiations between the parties in the hope of terminating continued 
litigation on the remaining issues. Thus, during the ensuing 
noon recess, the attorneys for the parties assembled for the 
purpose of settlement discussions. During the course of such 
discussions, certain alternative proposals for settlement were 
discussed and rejected by plaintiffs. 
Upon return of the parties from lunch, and immediately 
before the trial resumed, plaintiffs' counsel approached counsel 
for the defendants and announced that the plaintiffs were simply 
going to tender into court an acceptance of the tender of 
-5-
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performance filed by the defendants before trial. In effect, 
the plaintiffs completely bypassed the court-induced negotiations 
for a compromise and instead rushed back into court in an attempt 
to accept the tender of performance which had been made before 
trial and after their sworn testimony that they could not, under 
any cirexamstances, perform the Management Contract because of 
their adverse feelings towards Mr. Coombs and a long list of 
other circumstances, which Mr. Burton, with the prompting of his 
attorney, detailed to the court. (T-74-78). 
In other words, the plaintiffs attempted to take advan-
tage of the situation before the court formally recorded its 
granting of the defendants1 motion for dismissal of the antici-
patory breach action. This they did by attempting to quickly 
accept the pre-trial tender of performance without giving any 
explanation or assurance to the court or to Mr. Coombs as to 
how they could perform the contract in view of their prior 
testimony. 
If the plaintiffs were to succeed by such a maneuver, 
they would stand to get more than they were entitled to under 
the Management Agreement, i.e., a change of the name of the 
second motel, an inducement held out to plaintiffs prior to 
trial. This they would get without ever having to give any 
consideration therefor. The reason they didn't have to give 
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up anything was because, by this time, they had received infor-
mation from the court that their claim for anticipatory breach 
was essentially without value. They, in effect, at that point 
had nothing to give. 
At no time have the plaintiffs, or either of them, 
demonstrated by any testimony or act that their purported 
acceptance of the pre-trial offer of performance was in good 
faith. In fact, all indications and reasonable inferences 
are to the contrary* In view of the circumstances under which 
the plaintiffs attempted acceptance and the later testimony of 
Mr. Coombs concerning his observations regarding plaintiffs1 
good faith, the burden rested with them to come forth with some 
testimony or other evidence to satisfy the court on this point. 
Under all the circumstances, the defendants must now 
assert that the court should rule that the plaintiffs1 attempted 
acceptance of the defendants1 offer of performance tendered by 
way of pleading before commencement of the trial was not effect 
tive for the following reasons? 
1. The acceptance was not made in good faith, but 
was a simple legal maneuver in an effort to gain unfair advan-
tage of the defendants at a time when both the court and the 
defendants were attempting in good faith to solicit a compro-
mised settlement. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. The attempted acceptance of the pre-trial tender 
of performance was not made until after it had been both expressly 
and impliedly rejected by the plaintiffs. 
3. The said attempted acceptance fails since the 
plaintiffs did not furnish the consideration which the defend-
ants had bargained for in making the tender. 
It will be recalled that Mr. Coombs testified at the 
conclusion of the defendants1 evidence that he would not be 
adverse to having the plaintiffs return to the management of 
the motel if he could be satisfied that the plaintiffs were 
acting in good faith. Unfortunately, however, the plaintiffs 
have done nothing to demonstrate any measure of good faith since 
the dispute between the parties arose at the end of April 1973. 
The evidence presented by the parties at the trial of this case 
rather overwhelmingly demonstrates the lack of good faith of 
the plaintiffs. Evidence of their bad faith includes, but is 
not limited to, (1) the plaintiffs1 consistent position since 
April 28, 1973, that they would not return to work even though 
they left their management responsibilities without any prior 
notice and under circumstances which imposed a definite hardship 
upon the defendants; (2) the plaintiffs1 sworn testimony at trial 
that they could not return to a management of the motel; (3) the 
obvious hate for the defendants demonstrated by Mrs Burton at 
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the time of her emotional flare-up during her testimony on the 
first day of trial; (4) the plaintiffs1 unwillingness to engage 
in good faith settlement negotiations after the court had 
requested them to do so during the noon recess of the second 
day of trial; (5) the total failure of the plaintiffs to intro-
duce any evidence to support their questioned good faith in 
attempting acceptance of the defendants1 pre-trial tender; 
(6) the plaintiffs1 attempt to accept the defendants1 pre-trial 
tender of performance only after they had completed the presenta-
tion of their evidence and had received substantial notice from 
the court that they had failed to prove their anticipatory breach 
cause of action; and (7) the plaintiffs' apparent unwillingness 
to disavow their sworn testimony that they are incapable of again 
reassuming their management responsibilities. 
Plaintiffs have further demonstrated their propensity 
to act in bad faith by their admitted intentional design to remain 
unemployed until after the trial of this case had been concluded. 
All of the foregoing compels one to properly conclude 
that the defendants are justified in concluding that the plain-
tiffs are not in good faith and that they are not likely to 
suddenly reverse their past attitudes and practices so as to 
re-establish a harmonious working relationship in the future, a 
harmony which is essential to the proper operation of the business. 
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It is universally held by the courts that the good 
faith of the parties is a proper element to be considered. As 
stated at 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, Section 20: 
"Bad faith is held to be a ground for equitable 
relief or to constitute a foundation therefor. It 
is said that the good faith of the defendant is a 
proper and fundamental subject to be adjudged, and 
that good faith or bad faith or intent when constit-
uent and essential in a cause of action or defense 
is a fact and may be alleged and proved as such." 
Defendants feel that there is a presumption from the evidence 
that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith in belatedly attempting 
to accept the defendantsf pre-trial tender and that the court 
should so find. 
Defendants are reluctant to assert purely legal 
defenses to the plaintiffs" attempted acceptance of the defend-
ants1 pre-trial tender of performance since it is foreign to 
the spirit in which they made their tenders. However, such 
legal defenses do exist, and we cannot help but feel we are 
justified to assert them under the circumstances because the 
attempted acceptance was, in the opinion of the defendants, a 
bad-faith technical legal maneuver geared to take unfair advan-
tage of the defendants in light of the circumstances as they 
existed at the time. We feel compelled, in the interest of 
justice, to assert such defenses so as to properly preclude 
the plaintiffs from benefiting from such an act. Such defenses 
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include the claim that the offer had been rejected before 
accepted and was, therefore, not outstanding at the time of 
attempted acceptance, plus the claim that there was no con-
sideration to support an agreement. 
We feel that the court should consider the fact that 
the plaintiffs1 stated acceptance of the tender was made (1) 
after it had been rejected by the plaintiffs' counsel in his 
opening statement (the plaintiffs make this admission on page 
19 of their appeal brief) and (2) after the plaintiffs them-
selves had rejected it by sworn testimony to the effect that 
they were incapable of returning to the management of the motel. 
(T-74-79, parts quoted above). It is elementary law that an 
offer which is rejected ceases to be an outstanding offer. 
(17 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 39, Rejection by Offeree) 
"An offer is terminated by rejection and cannot 
thereafter be accepted so as to create a contract. 
Having once rejected the offer, the offeree cannnot 
revive it by tendering acceptance. 
"Any words or acts of the offeree indicating 
that he declines the offer, or which justify the 
offeror in inferring that the offeree intends not 
to accept the offer or give it further considera-
tion, amounts to a rejection." 
It also seems apparent that after the offer was made and not 
accepted, the offer was effectively withdrawn when the defend-
ants were then forced to proceed with litigation of the respec-
tive claims that the contract had been terminated by renunciation. 
-11-
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Furthermore, defendants feel that the court should 
consider the fact that the pre-trial tender by the defendants 
was in anticipation of avoiding litigation on the plaintiffs1 
claim of anticipatory breach* The court should thus recognize 
that for the plaintiffs to be able to accept the tender of 
performance after defendants had already been forced to litigate 
that issue is to impose an agreement without granting the defend-
ants the benefit of what they bargained for. In other words, 
the result of deciding that the acceptance was proper is to 
let the plaintiffs "have their cake and eat it too." The plain-
tiffs were required to give up nothing at the time of their 
announced acceptance. They had already been given their day 
in court, and they had been given substantial notice by the 
court that they had failed in their proof on the anticipatory 
breach issue. What then did they contribute as consideration? 
Furthermore, why should they now be awarded the right to have 
the name of the motel changed? What benefits did the plaintiffs 
bestow upon the defendants in exchange for the defendants' 
concessions? 
It seems inescapable that justice requires a resolution 
of this issue in favor of the defendants, not the plaintiffs, as 
the lower court concluded. It is fundamental in appellate review 
that the respondent (in this instance, the responding defendant) 
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is entitled to have the court consider all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to him* Toomers Estate vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 2 39 Pac. 2d 163. The reviewing 
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court and is not concerned with a preponderance of the evidence, 
but only with the question of whether there is substantial evi-
dence to sustain the judgment. Leon Glazier and Sons, Inc., vs 
Larson, 2 6 Utah 2d 429, 491 Pac. 2d 226. On appeal, the evidence 
in favor of the respondent must be considered to the exclusion 
of contrary evidence. Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc. vs. Hall, 
18 Utah 2d 3, 414 Pac. 2d 89. The court is further obliged to 
consider uncontradicted evidence in composite with all of the 
other evidence. Super Tire Market vs. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 
412 Pac. 2d 132. 
SUMMARY 
1. Offer of settlement was submitted in writing to 
the court and again restated during defendants1 opening arguments, 
2. Plaintiffs1 attorney rejected said offer and 
proceeded with his evidence. (R-19). 
3. Defendant, Burton, rejected the offer a second and 
third time during his testimony. (T-74-79) . 
4. An offer once rejected cannot be revived. 
5. Acceptance was in bad faith. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, the respondent on this Cross-Appeal urges the 
court as follows: 
1. To affirm the trial court in its decision that 
the defendants were not bound by their offer of settlement. 
2. To award defendants1 costs of court and 
reasonable attorney's fees for this appeal. 
DATED the / day of November, 19 76. 
Respectfully submitted: 
C&ui^ /v ' ^T^^t^O^^ 
ALAN H. COOMBS 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Four Seasons Motor Inn II 
and Alan H. Coombs 
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I hereby certify that I served a copy of the 
foregoing Appellants1 Response to Cross-Appeal to David 
E. West, attorney for respondents, at his address, 1300 
Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of November, 1976. 
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